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Abstract
We analyze the role of accounting specialists who help corporations evade/avoid
taxes in a game of incomplete information played by a tax authority, corpo-
rate taxpayers, and an accounting specialist. In addition to a full equilibrium
characterization, we establish that (i) marginal changes in enforcement are not
e¤ective when evasion/avoidance is pervasive; (ii) nes on rms as opposed to
specialists are more e¤ective in such situations; (iii) reducing auditing costs and
increasing creative accountingcosts are e¤ective in curbing evasion when tax
compliance is relatively high.
JEL Classication: H26, H32
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1 Introduction
The phenomenon of tax noncompliance is pervasive throughout the world1 and may
have unpleasant consequences for the economy. Economic literature usually agrees
The paper is based on the second chapter of my doctoral thesis at European University Institute.
I am thankful to Chaim Fershtman, Gregor Langus, Alexander Nesterov, Rick van der Ploeg, Ronny
Razin, and Karl Schlag for discussion, as well as to participants in seminars at EUI; the Universities
of Amsterdam, Frankfurt, and Hannover; the EEA Meeting in Budapest; and the PET Meeting in
Galway. I am greatly indebted to an anonymous referee and to an Associate Editor for their valuable
suggestions.
1See, for example, the survey by Schneider and Enste (2000).
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on four main issues: (i) noncompliance may increase the deadweight loss from dis-
tortionary taxation (Feldstein 1999); (ii) it may impede the ability of government to
collect tax revenue and serve its debt obligations (as in recent Greek experience2);
(iii) it calls for wasteful enforcement activities (Slemrod and Yitzhaki 2002); (iv) it
may hinder promotion of equity, as the e¤ective tax rate depends on the unobserv-
able characteristic of tax honestyand evasion opportunities (Andreoni et al. 1998).
Thus, it is important to understand what factors determine equilibrium tax compli-
ance, and this is precisely the research question most of the literature in this eld
aims at answering.
However, the vast majority of contributions to the tax compliance literature ab-
stract from the specic knowledge necessary for evasion and avoidance3. To show that
this is a regrettable omission, in the following, after introducing necessary denitions,
we discuss anecdotal evidence suggesting that tax specialists play an important role
in determining tax compliance.
Usually, a line between lawful underreporting of tax obligations, also known as tax
avoidance, and illegal understatement, referred to as tax evasion, is drawn. In reality,
though, it is virtually impossible to distinguish between the two. In this situation
it makes sense to break down underreporting into simple and sophisticated rather
than into evasion and avoidance. We dene simple tax evasion as understatement
that does not require special expertise (accounting or nancial). Correspondingly,
understatement of tax liability that requires such special knowledge will be called
sophisticated tax evasion.
There are no exact gures about any kind of tax evasion at our disposal. For simple
evasion, the shadow-sector estimations presented, e.g., in Schneider et al.(2010) are a
good proxy. Sophisticated evasion eludes such attempts, as it is reported and looks
legal up to the moment the whole complicated arrangement is uncovered. Thus, what
we can observe here are really big cases, the results of rm audits and of changes in
the proportion of corporate tax revenues in total tax revenues. The latter, as noted by
Slemrod (2004) for the US, have fallen from 6.4 percent of GDP in 1951 to less than 1.5
percent of GDP in recent years. Indirect evidence for growing sophisticated evasion
is provided by the fact that Americas largest and most protable companies paid
less in corporate income taxes in last three years, even as they increased prots,as
Browning (2004) states.
2Online at http://www.economist.com/node/16792848.
3For a detailed survey of income tax evasion literature, see Andreoni et al. (1998)
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Corporate tax evasion, as opposed to individual, can hardly be simple. For one
thing, corporations undergo regular (every three to ve years in most countries) au-
dits by the tax authorities. Thus, in order to hide simple evasion, a rm has either
to perform a transaction illegally, facing the problems of contract enforcement and
depriving itself of the benets of law, or to o¢ cially close down before the correspond-
ing check, rendering it impossible to gain reputation, which is crucial for successful
functioning in many markets.
Corporate scandals4 become possible with sophisticated evasion, which is hard to
detect, as it requires counterchecking of many legal entities, some of which may be
in a di¤erent tax jurisdiction (another city, state, country) or even liquidated by the
time of audit. A broad collection of material about such scandals5 has been prepared
by Roy Davies and includes Enron as probably the most famous case. An excellent
collection about US corporations involved in scandals is due to Citizen Works6.
The principal feature of corporate scandals is that ctitious contracts are made
to overstate the performance of a company. This is done to boost the benets of
chief executives and stock prices, and tax fraud comes as a by-product of such e¤orts.
Despite being a secondary goal, the tax evasion in these cases is very substantial, and
it is increasing, as anecdotal evidence suggests (Johnston 2003a,b).
Apart from the scandals, sophisticated evasion is represented by conventional tax
shelters. The following examples of shelters common in the US may seem benign,
but taken on a large scale are very detrimental to social welfare7: (i) deferring taxes
to later years; (ii) obtaining leverage through various nancing arrangements; (iii)
deducting prepaid interest; (iv) not including prepaid income.
How can the auditors help in performing sophisticated evasion8? First, they have
to certify the tax reports for public corporations. This also means that the auditors
are an essential part of sophisticated evasion schemes. Secondly, they may actually
assist smaller corporations, providing tax consulting that may include evasion. That
4A recent example is the German scandal related to Liechtenstein as a
tax haven; details are available in The Economist (Feb 21, 2008), online at
http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10733044
5Available at http://www.exeter.ac.uk/~RDavies/arian/scandals/classic.html#credit.
6Can be found on http://www.citizenworks.org/enron/corp-scandal.php
7The list and a discussion of tax shelters vs IRS measures to curb them can be found at
http://www.usa-federal-state-company-tax.com/tax_shelter_techniques.asp
8For a list of cases involving the four big auditors in 200709 see
http://www.usa-federal-state-company-tax.com/tax_shelters_2007-2009.asp
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is why in our paper the key role is played by the accounting specialist, modeled as
a local monopolist (alternatively, it can be a number of tacitly colluding specialists)
providing sophisticated evasion service for a set of real-sector rms.
Another application of our setup is even more direct: in former Soviet Union (fSU)
countries the evasion service is usually provided by an accounting rm associated
with a commercial bank. This way every client of a bank has an option to arrange its
accounts to minimize its tax obligations. The accounting rm is a local monopolist,
as there are substantial costs of changing a bank, and hence of changing the evasion
specialist. There is a lot of anecdotal evidence for money laundering through the
Russian banks. Sophisticated evasion goes hand in hand with laundering; in most
cases it is di¢ cult or impossible to separate the two phenomena9.
The study by Levine and Movshovich (2001) shows that sophisticated evasion
accounted for about 90% of all corporate tax evasion in fSU countries. Moreover,
the famous scandal with Yukos has opened up a bit the mechanism of such evasion
to the general public. Briey, the oil giant managed to reduce its corporate tax
liability virtually to zero by shifting its operations on paper to a small republic within
Russia and making special arrangements with the regional government. It is common
knowledge that other Russian corporations were not very di¤erent from Yukos in their
tax arrangements, but avoided prosecution.
Despite the evidence summarized above, the modest body of the literature that
does take into account tax specialists either (i) assumes away their participation in
evasion or (ii) looks at tax specialists inside a rm. Within branch (i), Reinganum
and Wilde (1993) focus on the potential of the specialists to lower the costs of ling
reports. Using a game of perfect information, they come to the conclusion that the tax
authority audits reports prepared by tax specialists more intensively. Franzoni (1999)
looks at the auditors as gatekeeperswho can moderate the relation between tax
authority and taxpayers. He nds that multiple perfect Bayesian equilibria become
possible due to the substitutability of public and private monitoring. The empirical
research is represented by studies by Klepper at al. (1991) and Erard (1993). The
principal nding here is that the specialists inhibit evasion on unambiguous items
(simple evasion), but stimulate it on ambiguous items (sophisticated evasion).
We are extending this strand of literature by including another type of tax spe-
cialists in the analysis. We are not describing the certied lawyers and accountants
9An example of a bank connected to an evasion specialist can be found in Zheglov (2006).
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that help to ll in tax reports. Rather, we have in mind nancial rms that run
accounts of the real-sector rms, tax havens that facilitate tax avoidance, or auditors
that verify the accounts of public corporations. Therefore, we assume that the rms
cannot opt for simple evasion, and that is a special feature of corporate as opposed
to personal tax evasion. In this setting, the specialists play a strategic role that is
absent in the analysis of Reinganum and Wilde (1993) and Franzoni (1999)10.
As for branch (ii), it is treated in the corporate tax evasion literature,11 which is
complementary to our paper, as it models tax specialists employed directly by rms.
Crocker and Slemrod (2005) use a principalagent framework to study incentives of
chief nancial o¢ cers (CFO) and shareholders to engage in evasion activities. They
characterize the optimal contract in the presence of asymmetric information about
the magnitude of the legal tax deductions and nd that penalties imposed on the tax
manager reduce evasion more than do those imposed on the shareholders.
Chen and Chu (2005) look instead at the incentives of chief executive o¢ cers when
the contracts between them and shareholders are not enforceable. They assume that
the rewards can be conditioned on the reported, but not on the actual, prot, and
show that the gain from evasion may only come at the expense of a loss in internal
control at the rm.
To the best of our knowledge, the only paper so far that takes into account the
participation of the external specialists in avoidance/evasion is Damjanovic and Ulph
(2010). Assuming an exogenous auditing strategy on the part of the tax authority
allows them to analyze equilibrium noncompliance as an intersection of the demand
for avoidance schemes and the supply of such schemes by the tax specialists. They
nd that greater progressivity of the tax schedule may reduce the supply of tax
avoidance/evasion schemes and that tax compliance is greater when pretax income is
distributed less equally. They also get a result that competition among tax specialists
is detrimental for compliance.
To further the analysis of corporate tax evasion and avoidance, we endogenize
the response of a tax authority to the reporting behavior of the rms, and we model
nancial specialists in a novel way. The reason for the former is that exogenous audit
probability seems too strong an assumption; for the latter, that we want to target
10In their work, the presence of the specialist only changes the tax agencys auditing behavior and
serves as an additional source of revenue. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this remark.
11Kopczuk and Slemrod (2006) provide a general macroeconomic framework for analyzing tax
evasion by rms, showing that standard equivalences of di¤erent taxes break down.
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the auditor rms or external accounting specialists (or even tax havens) rather than
internal nancial services.
Our research question is what the equilibrium relation between tax collection
parameters and the amount of evasion in the presence of tax specialists is. We do
not aim at explaining how the evasion industry comes into existence, or whether the
evasion specialists play some useful role in society. We take this sector as given and
look at how tax rates, nes, and industry structure can a¤ect it. The interaction
between tax authority, rms, and evasion specialists is modeled as a static game of
incomplete information in the spirit of Reinganum and Wilde (1986). The perfect
Bayesian equilibrium is used as a solution concept, and simple intuition is used for
equilibrium selection.
Our main result and contribution is the characterization of equilibria in this non-
trivial three-player game.
First, we nd equilibria of the evasion game with an exogenous price for specialist
service. In addition to the separating equilibrium (every type submits a distinct
report) analyzed by Reinganum and Wilde (1986), we discuss a pooling equilibrium,
in which everybody evades everything, and a hybrid equilibrium, in which low-prot
rms are pooling their reports and high-prot rms are separating. We only select
equilibria with pooling at zero report, which are natural focal points for the rms. If
the costs of tax-authority audits are high, only pooling is possible in equilibrium; with
medium auditing costs, a hybrid equilibrium exists; and with low costs, a separating
equilibrium exists, given that the price of the specialist is not too low.
Secondly, we provide a full description of the selected equilibrium of the whole
game for both monopolistic and competitive structure of the industry of tax special-
ists. We show that the monopolistic specialist chooses either full cheating, or the
separating (hybrid) equilibrium with an evasion level that is constant across incomes.
Fines on rms are more e¤ective in driving the economy away from complete
evasion than are nes on the specialist. This is in contrast to the result in Crocker
and Slemrod (2005), stating that nes on managers (agents) are preferable to nes
on rms (principals). Intuitively, in their framework higher CFO nes lead to the
restructuring of the evasion-favoring contract. In our setting, the rms play a role
of agents (the specialist being a principal), and it is better to ne rms, as they
imperfectly adjust to the nes, taking the specialist price as given. The specialists,
on the contrary, do not have this restriction they can adjust perfectly to the nes
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by choosing an appropriate price.
For markets with low auditing costs (separating equilibrium, low evasion) our
model points out the importance of compliance-enhancing factors other than con-
ventional enforcement. Indeed, in the separating equilibrium it is innitely costly to
ensure extinction of specialists by raising nes or simple auditing intensity. More-
over, with higher compliance it is increasingly costly to reduce sophisticated evasion
by tougher punishment a more promising way to ght it is through an increase in
costs of muddling accounts. This result is driven by the lack of commitment on the
side of the tax authority: The specialists can implement a low enough evasion level
to ensure that revenue-maximizing auditing intensity is arbitrarily small.
For the markets with high auditing costs (pooling equilibrium, high evasion),
marginal increases in enforcement parameters are generally not su¢ cient to bring
about a reduction in tax evasion. For that reason, drastic reforms may be needed to
ensure an improvement in compliance. The intuition here is that the specialists as
rst movers make sure that in response to higher nes, the real-sector rms reduce
their rents from evasion before reducing the evasion volume itself
The model setup is presented in section 2; the description of equilibria for an
exogenous price follows in section 3. Price setting by the specialist is considered in
section 4, followed by the government problem in section 5. Section 6 contains a
discussion of alternative specications of the model. In conclusion, the results are
summarized and policy implications are suggested.
2 The Model
Imagine a world in which there is a continuum of rms with measure one, each
characterized by some prot . The magnitude of this prot is a realization of a
random variable  distributed over the interval [min; max] according to a cdf F that
has a nite mean and strictly positive density everywhere on its domain. We require
that min be nonnegative.
There is a prot tax with a at rate t, together with surcharge rates per unit of
evaded tax, s1 on the rms and s on the specialist, set by the government. After
observing its prot, each rm has to decide how much tax it wants to evade. To do
so, the rm has to ask the tax specialist for assistance, e.g., to forge some bills issued
by ctitious rms.
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There is a tax authority that visits rms costlessly with a basic frequency r1.
Conditioned upon a visit, the probability of detecting sophisticated evasion is r. The
tax authority can alter this probability, but it is costly to do so. The simple auditing
probability r1 is exogenous to the decision of the tax authority, as we think of it
as reecting resources that the government has decided to invest in tax compliance
monitoring, e.g., a law determines how often the authority should visit the rms. As
long as the tax authority has a limited budget, we have to assume r1 < 1, though we
shall also discuss a degenerate case in which r1 = 1.
2.1 Sequence of moves and information
The evasion specialist moves rst, quoting the price p per unit of unreported income
at which it is ready to forge documents. The second move is made by nature, which
assigns a type embodied in the prot level  for each of the rms. The rms move
third, deciding on how much prot to report, r. The tax authority moves last,
deciding on the auditing probability r after observing the rmsreports. After this,
payo¤s to the tax specialist, rms, and tax authority are realized. The tax rate t,
surcharge rates s1 and s, and basic auditing frequency r1 are exogenous parameters
characterizing the institutional arrangement of the game.
All these parameters are common knowledge. The realization of its own prot
 is known to the rm and to the tax specialist; the distribution F of the random
variable  is common knowledge.
2.2 Players and strategies
1. Specialist. Consider a local monopolist that sets a price p 2 (0; 1) to maximize its
expected prot, taking into account the response of the real sector, r (p; ) (below
we drop the arguments for brevity) and a punishment for soliciting evasion, s. The
realized prot of the specialist is
 = pE (   r)  cs(E (   r))  str1Er (   r) ; (1)
where E (   r) is the total evaded income, and cs (:) is the cost function of the
specialist. Note that the realized and the expected prot are equal, as the specialist
serves an innite population of the real-sector rms.
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2. Taxpayers. Each of the rms characterized by prot  2 [min; max] maximizes
the expected after-tax prot I by choosing the tax report r (p; ) 2 [0; ]:
I(; r) =    tr   p (   r)  t(1 + s1)r1r (   r) : (2)
3. Tax authority. It chooses r (r; p), given a belief about , observed report r,
and known prot distribution F , to maximize expected revenue
R(r; r; ) = tr + rr1t(1 + s+ s1)(E f jr g   r)  c(r); (3)
where ( jr ) is a belief about the distribution of true prots given the reported
prots:
E f jr g =
maxZ
min
d( jr ):
In the case of separating equilibrium there are point beliefs
E f jr g = ^(r) : [0;+1)! [min; max] :
Notice that despite the complete revelation in a separating equilibrium, the tax au-
thority has to incur the auditing costs in order to prove that the sophisticated evasion
has actually taken place. Sending letters to the taxpayers with claims about their
hidden income would not be credible.
3 Exogenous price
We rst consider the exogenous specialist price, i.e., the subgame that excludes the
specialist from the list of players. We call a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of
this subgame complete pooling if everybody submits zero reports; we call it complete
separating if each rm submits a di¤erent report; we call it hybrid if some reports
are distinct and some are pooled. In any perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium, (i) the
reporting strategy of each rm is maximizing its expected after-tax prot given the
verication policy of the authority; (ii) the verication strategy of the authority is
maximizing its tax revenue given the beliefs about the reporting strategy; (iii) the
beliefs about the reporting strategy are consistent with the actual reports by the
rms.
Before characterizing the equilibrium of the game formally, let us discuss the
game intuitively and see what we may expect the equilibrium to look like. Firstly,
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since the tax authority has no commitment ability, the existence of the equilibrium
is not granted per se. In principle, it could be that we have a classical predatorprey
relation in which tax authority chooses low audit in response to low evasion. But
low auditing makes rms evade more, which in turn makes the tax authority raise
auditing intensity. Such cycling of best responses would mean that an equilibrium in
pure strategies does not exist.
Fortunately, Reinganum and Wilde (1986) establish the existence of separating
equilibrium in our setting without a specialist price. The way out of cycling is that
low reports are audited relatively heavily, and high reports relatively lightly. As a
result, the rms that enjoy low auditing do not have an incentive to evade more (lower
reports would trigger higher auditing intensity); the rms that evade a lot do not have
an incentive to make a higher report, as the decrease in auditing probability does not
compensate the loss from paying additional tax.
But if the tax authority is not e¢ cient enough, it will nd it too costly to audit
the lowest reports su¢ ciently intensively for this incentive-compatible arrangement
to work. In such a situation, the lower end of the distribution might want not to
report any prot. In the case of extreme ine¢ ciency, when the expected revenue from
auditing a randomly drawn report is lower than the cost of such auditing, no rm
will report anything.
This intuition is conrmed by the propositions below, with a qualication that a
low enough price of the specialist service induces complete pooling (full evasion) for
any positive costs of auditing, if nes are not too high ((1 + s1)r1 < 1). We discuss
this assumption after presenting the results formally.
We take the audit cost function from an example in Reinganum and Wilde (1986)
with c(r) =  c ln(1  r). We rst characterize a complete separating equilibrium, in
which we greatly borrow from Reinganum and Wilde (1986). We call the separating
equilibrium strict if each rm strictly prefers to make its equilibrium report; we call it
weak if all the rms are indi¤erent between making the equilibrium report and some
other report.
Denote the equilibrium values of the report by r, which is a function of the prot
, and the probability of deep auditing by r; the equilibrium point belief about the
true income is ^ (r). Before characterizing the equilibria of our subgame, we state
a lemma that species how the tax authority responds to a prot report (denote
 := (1 + s+ s1) tr1):
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Lemma 1 Consider a subgame dened by given specialist price p. The best response
of the tax authority with a belief  to a tax report r is
r (r; ) = 1  c
 (E f jr g   r) : (4)
The proof of the lemma and propositions 13 can be found in the appendix.
In the following proposition we establish the existence conditions for the separating
equilibrium in our subgame (denote B :=   (t  p) (1 + s+ s1) = (1 + s1)):
Proposition 1 (separating equilibrium) Consider a subgame dened by a given
specialist price p. Assume the auditing is cheap: c= < min.
(i) If t (1  r1 (1 + s1)) < p  min

t
 
1  r1 (1 + s1)
 
1  c (min) 1

; t
	
, there
exists a complete separating (strict) equilibrium characterized by the triple fr; r; ^g
with r dened by
   r () =

c

  c
B

e
B
c
(r() r(max)) +
c
B
; (5)
r = 1  c
 (^   r)
; (6)
^ (r) =
8>><>>:
min; r < 

r (min) ;
 1r () ; r 2 [r (min) ; r (max)] ;
max; r > 

r (max) :
(ii) If t
 
1  r1 (1 + s1)
 
1  c (min) 1

< p  t, there exists a complete separating
(weak) equilibrium characterized by the triple fr; r; ^g with r dened by
   r () =
c


1  t  p
(1 + s1)tr1
 1
(7)
and the expressions (6).
(iii) If p > t, there exists a complete separating (honesty) equilibrium characterized
by
r = ; (8)
r  0;
^ (r) =
(
 1r () ; r 2 [r (min) ; r (max)] ;
max; r =2 [r (min) ; r (max)] :
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The analysis of the pooling equilibria in our game is complicated by the fact that
there is a continuum of them12. However, we choose the pooling at zero report as
an obvious focal point. We also do not consider all kinds of hybrid equilibria that
could potentially arise in the subgame, but only the pooling at zero report for the
types below a certain prot, and the separating equilibrium for the types above it.
The reason for this is that we want to distinguish clearly the high-evasion regime
(complete pooling) and the low-evasion regime (complete separation or hybrid).
Proposition 2 (hybrid equilibrium) Consider a subgame dened by the given spe-
cialist price p. Assume the auditing is not very expensive: min < c= < E (j  0),
where 0 simultaneously solves (5) and the indi¤erence condition I(0; r (
0)) =
I(0; 0).
(i) If t (1  r1 (1 + s1)) < p  min
n
t

1  r1 (1 + s1)

1  c (E (j  0)) 1

; t
o
,
there exists a hybrid (strict) equilibrium characterized by the triple fr; r; vg with
r dened by (5), r
 dened by (6) for any   0, and
r () = 0; (9)
r = 1  c
E (j  0)
for any  < 0. The beliefs are
( jr ) =
8>>>><>>>>:
F (j  0) if r = 0;
D if 0 < r < r (
0) ;
 1r () ; r 2 [r (0) ; r (max)] ;
max; r > 

r (max)
(10)
8D jED f jr g  E
 
j  0+ r:
(ii) If t

1  r1 (1 + s1)

1  c (E (j  0)) 1

< p  t, there exists a hybrid
(weak) equilibrium characterized by the triple fr; r; vg dened by (6)(7) for any
  0 and (9) for any  < 0. The beliefs are determined according to (10).
(iii) If p > t, there exists a complete separating (honesty) equilibrium characterized
by (8).
The following proposition establishes existence conditions for the complete pooling
at zero equilibrium:
12Note that intuitive or divinity criteria are not applicable in our subgame, as it has a continuum
of types.
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Proposition 3 (pooling equilibrium) If p  t (1  r1 (1 + s1)) or c= > E,
there exists a complete pooling equilibrium characterized by the triple fr; r; g with
r  0; (11)
r = max

0; 1  c
E

;
( jr ) =
(
F () if r = 0;
D if r > 0;
D : ED f jr g = E:
A separating equilibrium does not exist.
If p > t (1  r1 (1 + s1)), the pooling equilibrium described above does not exist13.
The table below summarizes the results in Propositions 13:
c=
Low Medium High
Low Full cheating Full cheating Full cheating
p Medium Separation Hybrid Full cheating
High (p > t) Full honesty Full honesty Full honesty
We see that there are two factors that determine what kind of equilibrium exists:
(i) the relative auditing costs c=, (ii) the specialist price p. When the auditing costs
are very small (c= < min), there may be complete separating or complete pooling
equilibrium, depending on the specialist price. When the costs are higher (min <
c= < E (j  0)), complete separating equilibrium does not exist; the specialist
price determines whether hybrid or pooling equilibrium is played. For substantial
auditing costs (c=  E (j  0)), the equilibrium is either pooling or in mixed
strategies, so in our subsequent analysis we assume c= < E (j  0).
For a small specialist price there is complete pooling equilibrium, i.e., no rm
submits a truthful report, and the tax authority picks the rms for auditing with
uniform probability. For a higher price there is separating or hybrid equilibrium, in
which each rm with high enough prot conceals a part of it, and the tax authority
can deduce the prot of such rms from their reports. When the price is prohibitively
13This amounts to the uniqueness of the equilibria of Propositions 13 in the space of separat-
ing, hybrid, and all complete pooling equilibria. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this
observation.
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high, all the rms submit truthful reports and the tax authority does not perform
deep auditing, so we have full honesty equilibrium.
Intuitively, in the pooling equilibrium any rm should prefer submitting a zero
report to submitting a positive one. Thus, the gain from decreased auditing proba-
bility at higher report should not outweigh the loss of the prot from forgone evasion.
If the authority believes that any positive report implies higher than average prot,
it will not reduce its optimal auditing e¤ort enough to make a nonzero report attrac-
tive. Then for such out-of-equilibrium belief of the authority, pooling at zero is the
equilibrium, with the correct equilibrium belief being unconditional distribution of
prots.
In any equilibrium, a rm plays the best response to both the verication strategy
of the tax authority and the reporting behavior of other rms. In a separating equi-
librium with r() strictly increasing, every rm writes its report in such a way that
it reveals its prot level. This happens if p > t (1  r1 (1 + s1)). When the price of
auditing is high enough (t
 
1  r1 (1 + s1)
 
1  c (min) 1

< p  t), the rms are
indi¤erent between evading and reporting, so we have weak separating equilibrium.
The same logic applies to the hybrid equilibrium. The di¤erence is that all rms
with the prot below 0 submit zero reports. This allows for more intensive auditing
of the lowest reports than in the complete separation case. Hence, hybrid equilibrium
exists when auditing is costly enough for complete separation to fail. Hybrid equi-
librium is not distribution-independent: the threshold level of prot, 0, at which a
rm is indi¤erent between submitting zero and positive report is determined by the
shape of the prot distribution.
For p > t, evasion would not make sense, so the rms report full prot. The
lower threshold for price, t (1  r1 (1 + s1)), determines whether there is pooling or
separating equilibrium (recall that we select pooling at zero whenever there is neither
separating nor hybrid equilibrium). This threshold is determined by the tax rate and
the ne faced by a rm in case of detection: the higher the ne, the smaller is the
range where the separating (or hybrid) equilibrium does not exist.
At the extreme, when all the rms are visited (r1 = 1), the threshold becomes
 ts1, that is, separation exists for any specialist price, given that the auditing is not
too expensive. The threshold is very intuitive, as t can be thought of as the marginal
benet from evasion, whereas p+ tr1 (1 + s1) can be thought of as the marginal cost
for an audited rm (r = 1). Thus, when the benets are higher even for a detected
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evader, no separation can exist (everybody evades everything). However, in reality
the tax authority never has the resources to inspect all the rms, so r < 1. In fact, the
evidence summarized in Andreoni et al. (1998) implies that in reality r1 (1 + s1) < 1,
that is, the auditing probability is on average below its Nash equilibrium counter-
part14.
This completes the description of the game between tax authority and taxpayers.
It is valid for any industry structure of the specialist service, ranging from perfect
competition to monopoly. In any case, for a low specialist price an equilibrium with
rms evading everything is played; for a higher price a separating equilibrium with
rms evading some part of their prot is played; for a price higher than the tax rate
all rms report honestly.
Before looking more closely at the price-setting behavior of the specialist, the
interested reader may nd in appendix E two results that characterize the evasion
behavior in the separating or hybrid equilibrium considered.
4 Price setting
In the previous section we considered evasion subgame equilibria for any xed special-
ist price p. The interesting question, though, is what price a specialist would want to
charge if it were a monopolist15. For simplicity we assume here a linear cost function
of the specialist, cs (x) = csx. Recall that we have also assumed c= < E (j  0),
as otherwise only pooling equilibrium exists and the problem of choosing the specialist
price is trivial.
Clearly, if cs  t, honesty prevails, so there is no room for the specialist. Otherwise,
if cs < t, the specialist can choose any price p 2 (t (1  r1 (1 + s1)) ; t) to get a
separating or hybrid equilibrium, or any price p  t (1  r1 (1 + s1)) to get pooling,
or else close down, ensuring zero prot and complete honesty. Formally, the specialist
maximizes its prot by choosing p:Z max
min
(p  cs   str1r (r (p; ))) (   r (p; )) dF () : (12)
14We do not endogenize the basic auditing probability r1, as we believe this decision has substan-
tially longer horizon than the auditing intensity r. Moreover, it is likely to be a government, not a
tax-authority, decision. Hence, it is may be chosen to maximize welfare and not the tax revenue.
15Monopolistic structure seems most realistic for the evasion industry. For the details see the
introduction.
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The following condition turns out to be important for the specialists decision:
t < cs + (1 + s+ s1) tr1: (13)
Intuitively, this condition states that the marginal benet from evasion, t, is lower
than the sum of expected marginal costs of evasion for the specialist, cs + str1, and
for the real-sector rms, (1 + s1) tr1. Accordingly, there is no scope for full evasion
in this conguration. Note that r = 1 is implicit in this condition: the deep auditing
always discovers sophisticated evasion. Without perfect detection, we still expect no
complete evasion, as the deep auditing should be high when evasion is high (recall
that the tax authority always plays the best response).
When the condition (13) is not satised, that is, if the marginal benet from
evasion is higher than the sum of marginal costs even for perfect auditing, we expect
that pooling may be possible. This should happen if the specialist nds it attractive
to share the evasion gain, i.e., when the (implicit) price elasticity of demand for
evasion is high enough. This intuition is formalized in the following proposition16,
which characterizes the equilibrium play in our game:
Proposition 4 The specialist anticipates the subgame play given by Propositions 1
3. Its prot is maximized at:
(i) A separating equilibrium with the price t, if the condition (13) is satised.
(ii) A pooling equilibrium with the price pp = t (1  r1 (1 + s1)), if the condition (13)
is not satised and the following relation holds17:
(p   cs   str1)
Z max
min
e (p; ) dF () < (t  cs   )E + cs
1 + s+ s1
: (14)
Here p is determined by the following relation:Z max
min
e (p; ) dF () + (p   cs   str1)
Z max
min
ep (p
; ) dF () = 0:
(iii) A separating equilibrium with the price p 2 (pp; t], if the conditions (13) and
(14) are not satised.
16There is no straightforward relation between the parameters of the model and the elasticity of
demand for evasion; (14) states a precise condition under which the elasticity is high enough.
17Where e () :=    r ().
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The formal proof of (i) is left to appendix F. If the condition (13) is satised, the
prots from separating or hybrid equilibrium are maximized at the highest possible
separating price, t. In (ii) and (iii) the condition (13) is not satised, so the specialists
prot from separating equilibrium may be maximized at an interior. That is why in
(14) we implicitly compare prots from separation and pooling. Note that positive
prot in pooling equilibrium is assured by the violation of the condition (13), and
this implies that whenever the condition (14) is satised, there is a positive prot in
separation as well.
Roughly, if the nes are too low (t > cs + (1 + s+ s1) tr1), then either pooling
or separation can be played, depending on the structure of the nes. Otherwise the
system ends up in a separating or hybrid equilibrium with p = t.
5 Government
Now, consider the government, which cares about reduction of evasion. Similarly to
Crocker and Slemrod (2005), we look at the e¤ectiveness of di¤erent nes in deterring
evasion and get a nonequivalence result. In separating equilibrium both nes are
equally e¤ective, as the evasion e (t) = c= is minimal and constant across income
levels (apart from the pooled types in a hybrid equilibrium). In pooling equilibrium,
they are marginally equally ine¤ective, as the evasion volume is locally insensitive to
the enforcement parameters. An interesting case is a jump from pooling equilibrium
(ii) to separating or hybrid equilibrium (iii), and here nes on the real-sector rms do
a better job, as the following proposition states (the proof is presented in appendix
H).
Proposition 5 If the condition (13) is not satised and there is a pooling equilib-
rium, nes on the real rms are more e¤ective in pushing the system to a separating
equilibrium than nes on the specialist are.
Thus, our model predicts that the whole burden of punishment should lie on the
rms actually evading tax. One might think that this result stems from the monopoly
power of the specialist, who extracts all the rents in the separating equilibrium. In-
deed, the rms are favoring full cheating more, because they get a part of the pie
in the pooling equilibrium. However, in section 6 we show that the result on the
e¤ectiveness of the nes persists in the case of a competitive evasion industry. The
17
essential thing is that the specialist is a rst mover: It is her decision what price to
charge and thereby which equilibrium to induce in the subgame.
The prot in the separating equilibrium, s = (t  cs) c=, stays the same regard-
less of whether the specialist or the rms are ned. Thus, for our result about the
e¤ectiveness of nes to hold, charging the specialist must a¤ect her prots in pooling
equilibrium more weakly than charging the rms. Essentially, proposition 5 proves
just that. The intuition is fairly general: the specialist (or the evasion industry in
the competition case), as a rst mover, has but an imperfect instrument to adjust the
reaction of the real sector to the ne; at the same time, she can perfectly adjust her
own choice in response to the ne on the specialist.
Having looked at what it takes to go from full cheating to separation, it is natural
to also ask what it takes to go from separation to full honesty. In other words, if the
government wants to destroy specialists, as many newspapers recommend, how costly
would it be? As the evasion in separating equilibrium is xed at c=, it is obviously
innitely costly to get rid of it completely by raising nes. A much more e¤ective way
to make specialists inactive is to raise their costs all the way up to the tax rate. This
could be achieved through employing better accounts monitoring and cross-checking
systems, or by increasing the costs of running accounts.
The intuition here is straightforward: however large the nes are, it is always
possible to make underreporting so small that the auditing is rare and the expected
value from evasion is nonnegative. And even small evasion, if done by many rms,
may generate substantial revenue for the specialist. At the same time, if the operating
costs in the evasion industry are high enough, it simply does not pay to provide the
service. This result crucially depends on the auditing rule assumed in this paper:
the authority performs revenue-maximizing random auditing. If the tax authority
were committed to a xed auditing frequency, for example, high enough nes could
obviously eliminate evasion completely.
Finally, let us emphasize how the optimal tools for ghting evasion depend on the
extent to which the evasion is spread in an audit class. When the sophisticated evasion
is pervasive (pooling18), a marginal increase in enforcement is not likely to a¤ect
compliance behavior. In terms of our model, the system exhibits inertia with respect
to compliance, when in the pooling equilibrium. It is the specialist who adjusts the
18The evasion volume in the pooling equilibrium that we select is maximal. Under a weak condition
presented in appendix D, the evasion volume in any complete pooling equilibrium is larger than that
in the separating equilibrium.
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price and the tax authority that adjusts auditing the rms keep evading everything.
In such circumstances, the system should be pushed to the separating equilibrium
in order to achieve any reduction in evasion. This can be done by the means of
conventional enforcement (nes and auditing intensity), but the corresponding change
is bound to be nontrivial.
When sophisticated evasion is rare, marginal changes in enforcement are e¤ective
in reducing it, but at increasingly lower rate. In our model, the separating equilibrium
exhibits full honesty only at the limit of innitely high nes. This happens because
no matter what the nes are, the specialist can e¤ectively insure herself against them
and provide as little evasion service as is protable for given nes. On the other hand,
if the specialist faces high costs of producing the evasion service, she will decide to
close down anyway. Therefore, with small evasion rates the government may be better
o¤ making falsication of accounts more costly.
In addition to these ndings, we summarize the comparative statics for the two
types of equilibria we have19. The auditing probability in the pooling equilibrium,
1   c= (E), is increasing in the nes, the tax rate, and the supercial auditing
frequency. It is decreasing in the costs of auditing. The intuition is straightforward:
the former factors increase the direct benets of a deep audit; the latter one increases
its costs. The evasion volume is obviously not sensitive to parameter changes in the
pooling equilibrium.
In separation with p = t, there is no auditing, so the auditing probability is
insensitive to the parameter shifts. The cheating volume c= is a standard result also
obtainable from conventional models without specialists. Of course, we should keep
in mind that su¢ ciently cheap auditing is crucial for all our results, as otherwise full
cheating is an unchallengeable outcome.
6 Discussion: alternative specications
6.1 Industry structure
One may wonder what happens in an industry plagued with sophisticated evasion
if the specialists are not local monopolists as we have assumed above, but rather
compete in prices. In the rst stage of the game, then each specialist quotes a price,
19Payo¤s and comparative-statics results associated with the equilibrium play are derived in ap-
pendix G.
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and the subgame with the lowest price as a xed price for specialist service follows.
As in a simplest Bertrand setting, the competition will drive the prices down to the
marginal costs. A complication in our model is that the marginal costs are increasing,
and the demand is kinked. Namely, the specialists marginal cost is cs+ str1r (r; p),
and the demand for the service is the subgame equilibrium evasion whenever p  t.
One equilibrium candidate is charging the minimal marginal cost cs. This is
an equilibrium only in the very special case of t = cs. If t > cs, the specialist
charging p = cs su¤ers a loss of str1rE (   r ()), and has a protable deviation
consisting in not providing the service at all. The following proposition characterizes
the equilibrium in this case:
Proposition 6 If the specialists compete in prices à la Bertrand in anticipation of the
subgame play given by Propositions 13 and t > cs, the equilibrium is characterized
by the following specialist price:
(i)
pwc =
cs (1 + s1) + st
1 + s+ s1
(15)
if cs (1 + s1) + st > (  ce 1 (min))
 
r 11   (1 + s1)

. The weak separating equilib-
rium of the subgame is played.
(ii)
psc = cs + str1

1  c
e (psc)

; (16)
e (psc) =
Z max
min
(   r (psc; )) dF () (17)
if t (1  r1 (1 + s1)) < psc  t
 
1  r1 (1 + s1)
 
1  c (e (min)) 1

. The strict sepa-
rating equilibrium is played.
(iii)
ppc = cs + str1

1  c
E

(18)
if cs   str1c (E) 1 < t  . The pooling equilibrium is played in the subgame.
(iv) No pure strategy Bayesian SPNE exists if none of conditions (i)(iii) is satised.
Sketch of the proof. Any competitive equilibrium in our game must be charac-
terized by a zero-prot condition for the specialists. Depending on the subgame
equilibrium, this is (15), (16), or (18). Indeed, the cost of serving the rms isR max
min
(cs + str1r
 (r (p; ))) (   r (p; )) dF (), whereas the revenue is
20
p
R max
min
(   r (p; )) dF (). After equating and rearranging we get the expressions
above.
Consider possible deviations of any of the specialists (there can be any nite
number of them larger than one) charging the price specied by the proposition. The
deviations to any higher price bring about the same payo¤, i.e., zero. The deviations
to any lower price bring about losses. Note that rationing customers at a lower price
does not help to reduce costs, as the tax authority observes the price, not the quantity,
and audits according to the best response specied in the subgame. Thus, we indeed
have an equilibrium strategy for all the specialists, if the specied price corresponds
to the subgame equilibrium.
Finally, we provide the conditions under which each of the subgame equilibria is
played. When the specialist costs are su¢ ciently high, the separating equilibrium
results in zero prot. When the cost are low, a separating equilibrium brings about
positive prots, so the rms charge a price low enough to trigger a pooling equilibrium.
When any separating equilibrium brings about positive prot, but the pooling equi-
librium results in a negative prot, the specialists randomize, and no pure-strategy
equilibrium obtains.
Competition is e¤ective in our setting: it drives the prots of the specialists to
zero independently of parameter values. Contrary to the monopolistic case, the real-
sector rms are left with an expected surplus from evasion. In pooling equilibrium
this is of magnitude (t (1  r1 (1 + s1))  ppc).
We want to compare the two industry structures according to the volume of
evasion they generate. First, the condition for the pooling is c (t  cs   str1) <
(t  cs   )E in the monopoly case versus  str1c < (t  cs   )E in the com-
petition case. It can be seen that the former condition is more stringent. Thus,
competition results in a larger evasion volume than a monopoly does, whenever
 str1 < (t  cs   )E=c < t   cs   str1. Second, in a separating equilibrium
the evasion volume is larger with competition whenever pc < t, as the monopolist
chooses a minimum of c=. This leads us to the following corollary.
Corollary 1 If the condition (13) is satised, the evasion volume with competition
among the specialists is at least as high as with a monopoly.
The usual intuition from industrial organization theory goes through in our model:
monopoly leads to a reduction of production relative to the competitive benchmark.
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In our setup, it is the sophisticated evasion service that is being produced. Hence,
in so far as we do not like monopoly in the production of goods, we should like it
in the production of bads,supposing it is too costly to eliminate such production
altogether.
As we can see, our previous result about the relative e¤ectiveness of the nes still
holds in the absence of monopoly power. Namely, the same term  str1 makes ning
specialists better for the pooling. In the weak separating equilibrium the nes are
equally ine¤ective: their inuence is completely o¤set by the adjustment of price, and
the evasion level stays at a constant c (1  (t  cs)) 1. Remarkably, the evasion level
here is increasing in tax rate, contrary to the monopolistic case.
6.2 Specialist cost function
One of the assumptions that restrict applicability of our analysis is the linear cost
function of the specialists. Indeed, one may believe that it becomes increasingly costly
to muddle through the accounts as the evasion volume increases, both on the rm
and on the industry level. While the cost rise on the rm level is partially reected
in the detection probability increase, the industry-level cost rise has been left out of
our model so far.
At the same time, there can be the opposite spillover e¤ect: it is costly to develop
a complicated evasion scheme, but, once developed, it can be applied to many rms
relatively inexpensively. This technology e¤ect may actually provide an additional
justication for the monopolistic structure of the industry of sophisticated evasion.
We shall think of the spillover e¤ect as some xed costs needed to start the busi-
ness. The opposite e¤ect can be captured by a convex cost function. The specialists
objective function (12) then becomesZ max
min
(p  str1r (p; )) e (p; ) dF ()  cs
Z max
min
e (p; ) dF ()

  C: (19)
Consider the xed costs C rst. As they do not distort the pricing decision of the
monopolist, all our results go through, with the qualication that for high enough
xed costs full honesty equilibrium results.
The convexity does introduce additional complications, but the condition for prof-
its to be maximized at p = t can be reduced to an expression like (13), where
instead of cs we use c0s (e). A more precise condition can be written as e (t) +
(t  str1   c0s (e)) e0 (t)  0, which is of course a familiar inverse elasticity rule of
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the monopolist adapted to our setting. Intuitively, depending on whether equilib-
rium evasion is larger or smaller than that in the linear-cost case, the condition will
be correspondingly less or more restrictive. The separating equilibrium will be pre-
ferred for a larger set of parameter values, as full cheating becomes relatively more
costly. The rest of the story is virtually unaltered.
6.3 The authoritys cost function
The cost function of the authority used in our model may seem very specic. However,
Reinganum and Wilde (1986) have shown that the separating equilibrium of the type
that we discuss exists for a large class of auditing functions. Namely, they assume
c (0) = 0, and twice continuous di¤erentiability with 0 < c0 (r) <1, 0 < c00 (r) <1,
lim
r!1
c0 (r) = 1, and c0 (r) =c00 (r) + r > 1= (1 + s). The best response of the tax
authority is then
r (r; v) = c
0 1((E f jr g   r)); (20)
which is a generalized form of the expression (4).
Obviously, our strict separating equilibrium of the subgame is valid under the
same restrictions, as it completely mimics the equilibrium of Reinganum and Wilde.
The weak separating equilibrium also exists under these conditions, with
e =
1

c0

t  p
(1 + s1)tr1

: (21)
Finally, the pooling at zero equilibrium also survives the generalization, with the
existence conditions modied appropriately.
We have chosen a specic function for a clear characterization of the subgame
equilibrium, but it can be seen that our equilibrium structure admits generalization
to the class of auditing functions in Reinganum and Wilde (1986).
7 Conclusion
The game between tax authority, taxpayers, and a tax specialist featuring stylized
reality of corporate scandals and sophisticated evasion is analyzed in this paper. We
consider illiterate rms, i.e., rms that do not know how to evade taxes. We identify
three types of equilibria for a given specialist price: (i) complete pooling at zero report;
(ii) complete separation with true prot revelation; (iii) hybrid equilibrium with low
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types submitting zero reports and high types revealing their prot. Furthermore,
complete separating and hybrid equilibria can be of two di¤erent types, strict or
weak. As suggested by the terms, in strict equilibrium the rms strictly prefer to
submit equilibrium reports; in weak equilibrium the rms are indi¤erent between
cheating and reporting honestly. Finally, there is a special case of the separating
equilibrium in which all rms report truthfully.
Introducing the specialist who can choose the price for her services reduces the
number of equilibrium types for a large set of parameter values: the specialist chooses
(i) complete pooling or (ii) separating or hybrid equilibrium at the highest possible
price. In separating equilibrium the specialist gets all the evasion rent, whereas in
pooling she has to share it with the rms. For the high-evasion regimes (pooling at
zero equilibrium), nes on the evading rms are more e¤ective in driving the system
out of full evasion than nes on the specialist preparing documents for this evasion.
For the low-evasion regimes (separating or hybrid equilibrium), increasing the costs
of complicating accounts is more e¤ective than conventional enforcement measures.
Our results are robust to a number of changes in the model specication. Com-
petition between the specialists expands the set of possible equilibria and increases
tax evasion, but it does not change the equilibrium structure or the e¤ectiveness of
the enforcement instruments. A convex cost function of the specialist does not alter
the analysis. Finally, the equilibrium structure is preserved for a rather broad class
of monotonically increasing convex auditing functions20.
While interpreting our results, one should keep in mind that the derived equilib-
rium describes a situation in a given audit class. The di¤erences in audit classes are
summarized by the auditing cost function of the tax authority. In the presence of
a monopolistic tax specialist, our model predicts polarization of evasion/avoidance
levels in di¤erent audit classes, viz., very high levels for classes with expensive au-
diting, and low levels for classes with cheap auditing. This prediction is potentially
testable empirically, in that with competitive tax specialists or simple (noncorporate)
evasion, the distribution of evasion volume across di¤erent audit classes should be
more uniform.
Aggregation issues aside, our results may be in line with some economy-wide
experiences. For example, the success of Russian tax law enforcement policy in the
20The equilibrium structure is also robust to introducing (not too high) risk aversion 
the equilibrium prices are just shifted down from t and t (1  (1 + s1) r1).
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at-tax reform, which was accompanied with both a large increase in punishment for
evasion for the rms and no change in the responsibility of accounting specialists, is
consonant with our inequivalence result. The SorbannesOxley act in the US, on the
other hand, may be justied in light of the result that the costs of falsifying accounts
are e¤ective in reducing evasion in high-compliance separating equilibrium.
This might suggest that developing countries with low compliance could nd them-
selves better o¤ by following the reform path, whereas developed countries with high
compliance could benet from introducing stricter regulation of nancial intermedi-
aries. The interpretation of developing countries experiencing high levels of evasion
and developed countries enjoying high compliance is a bit simplistic, as compliance
behavior is endogenous in our model and di¤erences in compliance may come from
various sources, e.g., di¢ culty of law enforcement, di¤erences in detection technology,
tax morale, etc.21 However, all these factors may be summarized by inclusion in the
costs of auditing (where we may understand costs broadly, including any social and
psychological factors) and the enforcement parameters in our model. Given these
parameters, our results allow us to describe theoretically what kind of equilibrium
is played. Thus, though the developingdeveloped interpretation should be applied
with caution, it may deserve some attention in policy debates.
Recently, a rapidly growing literature on tax havens (see Slemrod and Wilson
(2009) and references therein) has started analyzing tax avoidance and its e¤ect on tax
competition between governments. Tax havens may be looked upon as tax specialists,
because they are essential in the provision of the avoidance and sophisticated-evasion
service. Clearly, tax havens cannot be punished with nes, as they are separate
jurisdictions. Our model suggests that this does not represent a constraint for a
government interested in reduction of sophisticated tax evasion, as nes on domestic
rms are at least as good a deterrent as nes on havens would be. All our main
results are new to the tax-haven literature, as it assumes away strategic interaction
between tax authority, rms, and tax havens.
The analysis presented is by no means limited to the tax avoidance/evasion phe-
nomenon. A very similar problem arises, for example, in the interaction of a com-
petition authority and rms that are colluding. Most often collusion agreements are
bound to be detected if not executed through intermediaries, which are specialist
rms. The same story applies: not punishing these intermediaries does not represent
21I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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a problem per se.
This work could be extended in a number of ways. The government could be added
as an active rst mover to set institutional parameters in a way to maximize social
welfare or some other objective. Further, the model could be extended to general
equilibrium in order to study welfare aspects of enforcement policies. Finally, it would
be interesting to estimate the e¤ect of changing enforcement and cost parameters on
sophisticated evasion and avoidance.
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Appendices
A - Proof of Lemma 1 - Tax authority best response
As we have seen, the tax authority maximizes
R(r; r;) = tr + r(E f jr g   r)  c(r);
the rst order condition is hence
 (E f jr g   r)  c0(r) = 0; (22)
and the second order condition is simply c00(r) > 0.
For the assumed cost function c(r) =  c ln(1  r) the FOC can be rewritten as
r (r; ) = 1  c
 (E f jr g   r) ; (23)
which is the statement of the Lemma. In a separating equilibrium E f jr g = ^;
in case of pooling at zero or any other report below min, we have E f jr g =
28
E, as the only consistent belief of the authority is the true underlying distribution
( jr ) = F (). When the pooling is at a report above min, the belief is updated
according to Bayes formula ( jr ) = (F ()  F (r)) = (1  F (r)) for   r and
( jr ) = 0 for  < r as the tax authority knows that the taxpayers are rational.
But in this paper we mostly restrict our attention to the pooling at zero equilibrium.
B - Proof of Proposition 1 - Separating equilibrium
The separating equilibrium has to satisfy the following conditions: 1) absence of
deviation incentives for the taxpayer when the tax authority audits each report with
equilibrium probability; 2) absence of deviation incentives for the tax authority when
every taxpayer submits equilibrium report; 3) consistent beliefs of the tax authority
about the true income of the taxpayers who submit equilibrium reports; 4) arbitrary
beliefs of the tax authority about the true income of the taxpayer who submits out-
of-equilibrium report.
Concerning 2), the best response of the authority given its belief ^(r) is given by
(4). This is straightforward from the authority maximization problem (the payo¤ is
concave in r). The restriction on r is obviously 0  r  1, and it is satised whenever
(^(r)  r)  c (24)
In words, each report should bring more revenue than costs. If this condition does
not hold, the authoritys best response is not to audit the report.
For 1) and 3) we have to consider two cases, strict and weak equilibrium.
strict equilibrium
In the strict equilibrium (the rms strictly prefer the equilibrium reporting strategy)
the rms maximize their after-tax expected prot
   tr   (p+ t(1 + s1)r1r) (   r) :
The rst order condition to this problem is
 t  t(1 + s1)r1r0 (r) (   r) + p+ t(1 + s1)r1r = 0;
and the second order condition is
 r00 (r) (   r) + 2r0 (r)  0:
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One can check that it is satised in equilibrium for our auditing function c(r) =
 c ln(1  r).
Plugging in the tax authority best response (assume ^   r > c), we can rewrite
the rst order condition as
1  c
 (^   r)   (   r)
c
 (^   r)2
(^0 (r)  1) = t  p
t(1 + s1)r1
:
Using the consistent beliefs in the candidate equilibrium ^ = , we get
  c
 (^   r) ^
0 (r) =
t  p
t(1 + s1)r1
  1;
For convenience denoting evasion associated with a given report as e(r)  (r) 
r; e
0(r)  0(r)  1, we have
c (e0 + 1) =

1  t  p
t(1 + s1)r1

e:
Using B dened as in the text (B :=   (t  p) (1 + s+ s1) = (1 + s1)) we have
ce0  Be+ c = 0: (25)
This is a rst order ordinary di¤erential equation (DE). Its solution is a sum of
general solution to the corresponding homogenous DE and a particular solution to
the non-homogenous DE. Homogenous equation is ce0(r) Be(r) = 0. Its solution
is
e(r) = A exp frg ;  = B
c
:
To nd a particular solution, put e0(r) = 0 to get e(r) = cB : Thus, the general
solution of our equation will be e(r) = A exp

B
c
r
	
+ c
B
. To pin down the constant
A we need an initial condition, r (rmax) = 0 reecting the fact that the maximal
report should not be audited (we assume that it is not protable, which, strictly
speaking, does not have to be true unlessmax
R
R(r () ; e (r ()))dF () is achieved
at r (rmax) = 0). Thus,
1  c
 (max   rmax) = 0
rmax = max   c

:
After rearrangement, we have
A =

c

  c
B

exp

 B
c
rmax

:
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This provides us with the expression (5).
For 3) we need the consistency of beliefs, that is the authoritys belief about (r)
must coincide with actual reporting strategy r(). This is only possible, if (r) is
increasing, and in this case consistency is actually ensured by the best responses in
our formulation. Then, the following condition should be satised:
0 (r) = 1 +

c

  c
B

B
c
e
B
c (r max+ c) > 08r 2 [rmin; rmax]
It turns out to be useful to look at the coe¢ cient of the exponent, B=   1. It
is negative for p < t, and hence the coe¢ cient is negative. Using this to simplify
the condition for positive derivative, we get  <    B in case of B > 0, which is
obviously true. In case of B < 0 the condition is max < c=, but then the strict
separating equilibrium does not exist for p < t, as r  0 and all rms prefer evading.
To sum up the argument, B > 0 ) y0 > 0; B < 0 ) @y, so the separating
equilibrium may only exist for B > 0 or
p > t (1  r1 (1 + s1)) : (26)
What happens if the reporting is decreasing in the prot? Then the initial condi-
tion is
1  c
 (min   rmax) = 0
rmax = min   c

And so A is the same. The di¤erence is that there is no problem for 0 (r) < 0, so
that
0 (r) = 1 +

c

  c
B

B
c
e
B
c (r max+ c) < 0
B

  1

e
B
c
(r rmax) <  1
with B < 0 satised for sure. So the really binding in this case is of course r (max) 
0 
c

  c
B

exp

B
c
rmax

+
c
B
 max
We have to also respect the individual rationality constraint, that is the above
described reporting strategy should be preferred to honest reporting:
   tr   (p+ t(1 + s1)r1r) (   r) > (1  t);
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which can be rearranged to obtain
p < t (1  r1 (1 + s1) r) :
Since max r = 1  c
(min rmin) , we have
p < t

1  r1 (1 + s1)

1  c
 (min   rmin)

: (27)
The last check is for the equilibrium reports to be positive, as the negative re-
ports are not allowed (or do not make sense, since no negative tax is paid). The
corresponding restriction can be formulated as
c

  c
B

exp

B
c

c

  max

 min   c
B
:
Since 0 < B <  (the positivity required by consistency of beliefs discussed later), the
condition is satised for c=B < min, that is when p 2

t 

1  c
min

t(1 + s1)r1; t

- exactly when the rationality constraint is not satised.
When c=B > min > c=, the condition is actually satised for the interval p 2
t (1  r1 (1 + s1)) ; t 

1  c
min

t(1 + s1)r1

, as can be directly checked at the
borders (B = 0 and B = c
min
) and by monotonicity and continuity applies to the
whole interval.
Collecting the restrictions, we have c= < min,
p 2

t (1  r1 (1 + s1)) ; t 

1  c
min

t(1 + s1)r1

as necessary and su¢ cient con-
ditions for complete separating (strict) equilibrium existence.
weak equilibrium
In the weak equilibrium the rms are indi¤erent between submitting reports truthfully
and engaging into evasion. Formally,
   tr   (p+ t(1 + s1)r1r (r)) (   r) =    t:8
After rearranging this condition using the tax authority best response (4), which
with the constant evasion takes the form 1  c
e^
, we arrive at
e^ =
c


1  t  p
t(1 + s1)r1
 1
:
Imposing the consistency of beliefs e^ = e we get the expression in the proposition.
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Note that restriction on evasion volume in this case is
c

< e < min;
which in terms of the price looks like
t

1  (1 + s1) r1

1  c
min

< p < t:
In this equilibrium the expected punishment is exactly equal to the expected gain
from the evasion regardless of the evasion level: t(1 + s1)r1r (r) = t  p. Protable
deviations are impossible, as any report brings about the same payo¤.
To complete the characterization of subgame equilibrium (requirement 4)), out-
of-equilibrium beliefs of the tax authority (for both strict and weak equilibrium) are
specied as  (r) =
(
min; r < rmin
max; r > rmax
. Note that we do not have to specify
beliefs for any possible deviation to reports in [rmin; rmax] ; as the tax authority has
no chance of observing such a deviation.
C - Proof of Proposition 2 - Hybrid equilibrium
We have shown that for c= > min, the complete separation equilibrium does
not exist. Here we are interested whether a hybrid equilibrium with the follow-
ing properties exists: (i) all the taxpayers with  2 [min; 0] submit zero reports;
(ii) all the taxpayers with  2 (0; max] submit di¤erent reports (0r; rmax]; (iii)
r (r > 0) < r (r = 0); (iv) I (0; 0) = I (0; 0r). The rst two are dening proper-
ties, the second is the decreasing in report auditing, the third follows from continuity
of the distribution. let us look at (iii) more closely.
Since we know the auditing has to be a best response in equilibrium, from (22) we
get for our auditing cost function r (r > 0) = 1  c(^ r) < 1  cE(j0) = r (r = 0)
or, in particular,
E
 
j  0 > ^0   0r: (28)
This is a consistency requirement on the side of the tax authority.
For the rms consistency, we need
I
 
0; 0

= 0   (p+ t(1 + s1)r1r (0)) 0
= 0   t0r  
 
p+ t(1 + s1)r1r
 
0r
  
0   0r

= I
 
0; 0r

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we need the equality, because otherwise by continuity there is incentive to deviate.
Working out this condition, we arrive at
0   0r 
^0   0r
   0
E (j  0) =  
B
c
0r
using consistency of beliefs, we get
B
c
0r =
0   E (j  0)
E (j  0) (29)
This actually denes the level of report 0r as a function of p and 
0 in the hybrid
equilibrium. This also immediately imposes B > 0 on the parameters. The problem
is that nothing pins down 0. However, if prot is distributed uniformly over [0; max],
this becomes 0r =
c
B
. Here the prot does not enter, because with uniform distrib-
ution the ratio
0 E(j0)
E(j0) is constant, which is not true for a general distribution.
We have to make sure that after-tax income is increasing in pre-tax income plus check
incentive and participation constraints as in case of complete separation.
strict equilibrium
Since the separation part of the problem is identical to the previous one (complete
separation), we get the same result up to 0, only cut at the point dened by (29).
So solving two equations simultaneously, we get 0 and 0r. For the uniform, we have
0 =

c

  c
B

exp

B
c

c
B
  max + c


+ 2
c
B
:
Combining the consistency conditions of the tax authority (28) and the rms (29),
we get
c
B
> E
 
j  0 > 0   0r:
For the uniform distribution, for example, it takes the form 0 < c=B, which is
satised.
The report is positive by construction, and evasion must be also positive. And it
is, since it is decreasing in report and at the maximal prot is positive c=. We have
to modify rationality constraint (27) to the analogous expression for the polled types
in hybrid equilibrium:
p  t  1  r1 (1 + s1) r  0; 0r :
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To check for absence of deviation from the pooling part, we have
I
 
 ; 0

=     (p+ t(1 + s1)r1r (0))  
>     t0r  
 
p+ t(1 + s1)r1r
 
0r
  
    0r

= I
 
 ; 0r

or 
t  p
t(1 + s1)r1
  r  0r 0r >  r (0)  r  0r  
Since r (0)   r (0r) > 0, the rhs increases in  . At 0 it reaches maximum with
equality, so the condition is indeed satised.
From the separating part,
I
 
+; 0

= +   (p+ t(1 + s1)r1r (0)) +
< +   t+r  
 
p+ t(1 + s1)r1r
 
+r
  
+   +r

= I
 
+; +r

or 
t  p
t(1 + s1)r1
  r  +r  +r <  r (0)  r  +r  +
by the same logic works for 0r. Thus also true for 
+
r , as I (
+; +r ) > I (
+; 0r)
by the separating part condition.
To complete the characterization of the hybrid equilibrium, out-of-equilibrium
beliefs of the tax authority should be specied. It is su¢ cient that 8r 2 (0; 0r)
r (0)  r (r) =) ED (jr)  r + E (j  0). Actually, for the pooled types it
su¢ ces to have ED (jr)  E (j  0) by the same logic as considered below for
complete pooling. For the separated types, a weaker su¢ cient condition is a mess, so
we do not state it here.
weak equilibrium
In the weak hybrid equilibrium the types below 0 evade everything; the types above
are indi¤erent between honesty and cheating. Using the same logic, we arrive at (7)
for the separating part. The restriction is slightly di¤erent,
p > t  t(1 + s1)r1r
 
0; 0

;
and complements the rationality constraint for the strict hybrid equilibrium.
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D - Proof of Proposition 3 - Pooling equilibrium
A pooling equilibrium has to satisfy the following conditions: 1) absence of deviation
incentives for the taxpayer when the tax authority audits any report with equilib-
rium probability; 2) absence of deviation incentives for the tax authority when every
taxpayer submits zero report; 3) arbitrary beliefs of the tax authority about the true
income of the taxpayer who submits out-of-equilibrium report.
As mentioned in the text, we only consider the pooling at zero equilibrium, as we
consider zero report a natural focal point for underreporting.
As far as 1) is concerned, the payo¤ from zero report should be preferred to
any deviation for any prot level. As for 2), tax authority chooses the auditing
probability (11) that maximizes its revenues given zero report. Finally, for 3) we
need an analogous expression for a deviator, and that should depend on the out-of-
equilibrium beliefs of the tax authority, that is it can be any belief. We consider an
arbitrary belief D, but notice that the most adverse for the deviator belief (and hence
most favorable for the equilibrium) is that the deviator has maximum prot max.
So, the net expected prot of the rm with gross prot  and a report r can be
written as
I (r; ) =    tr   p (   r)  t(1 + s1) (   r) r1r (r) ;
where the tax authority auditing is given by (22):
r(r; D) =
8>><>>:
1  c
E
; r = 0;
1  c
(EDfjr g r) ; r 2

0; ED f jr g   c
i
;
0; r  ED f jr g   c :
We have to then consider three cases:
I (0; ) =    p   t(1 + s1)r1

1  c
E

;
I (r; ) =    tr   p (   r)  t(1 + s1) (   r) r1

1  c
 (ED f jr g   r)

;
I (r ; ) =    tr   p (   r) :
First, we show that I (0; )  I (r ; )8; r  ED f jr g  c . As I (r ; ) is
decreasing in r, it is enough to show that the inequality holds for r = ED f jr g 
c

:
   p   t(1 + s1)r1

1  c
E

 (1  p)   (t  p)

ED f jr g   c


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Thus, a su¢ cient condition for no deviation with a belief D such that ED f jr g >
max  
 
max
E
  1 c

is
t(1 + s1)r1  t  p;
which as we have seen is complementary to the separating equilibrium existence con-
dition. A necessary one for a belief D is
t(1 + s1)r1
t  p max

1  c
E

+
c

 ED f jr g
Secondly, we show that I (0; )  I (r; )8; r 2

0; ED f jr g   c
i
. Note
rst that I (r; ) is decreasing in r, if the condition t(1 + s1)r1  t  p is satised
and if @ED f jr g =@r  1. Then it is enough to consider a marginal deviation:
   p   t(1 + s1)r1

1  c
E

    p   t(1 + s1)r1

1  c
ED f jr g

:
This is clearly satised for any out-of-equilibrium belief D such that ED f jr g 
E. So with p  t (1  (1 + s1)r1) the pooling at zero equilibrium exists.
In the rest of the paper we assume that the pooling at zero equilibrium is played
whenever the separating equilibrium (or considered hybrid equilibrium) does not exist.
As we have seen, this is only true for certain out-of-equilibrium beliefs. However, (i)
there is no complete pooling equilibrium that exists for any out-of-equilibrium beliefs,
(ii) considering all possible hybrid equilibria complicates the analysis substantially;
moreover, they are not likely to be more robust or realistic than the equilibria consid-
ered, (iii) having two extreme cases of separation (or hybrid) and pooling provides a
clear benchmark for the analysis of factors that a¤ect evasion volume in our setting.
When t(1 + s1)r1 > t  p (separating or hybrid equilibrium exists), the rst (now
necessary) condition is
t(1 + s1)r1
t  p

1  c
E

max +
c

 ED f jr g ;
which breaks down if
max

t(1 + s1)r1
t  p   1

 c
(1 + s+ s1) tr1

ED f jr g
E
  1

:
Clearly, 9D : ED f jr g  E for which this is satised, meaning that pooling
equilibrium does not exist.
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On pooling at a positive level   min
The three cases now are
I (; ) =    t   p (   )  t(1 + s1) (   ) r1

1  c
 (E )

;
I (r; ) =    tr   p (   r)  t(1 + s1) (   r) r1

1  c
 (ED f jr g   r)

;
I (r ; ) =    tr   p (   r) :
First, we show that I (; )  I (r ; )8; r  ED f jr g  c . As I (r ; )
is decreasing in r, it is enough to show that the inequality holds for r = ED f jr g 
c

:
t(1 + s1)r1 (   )

1  c
 (E )

 (t  p)

ED f jr g   c

  

:
A necessary condition for a belief D is
t(1 + s1)r1
t  p (max   
)

1  c
 (E )

+
c

+   ED f jr g ;
which is more stringent than the condition for pooling at zero whenever t(1+ s1)r1 <
t  p. In fact, ED f jr g > E has to be satised, so no pooling at positive report
is possible, if ED f jr g = E.
Since only ED f jr g  max is consistent with rationality, we have
t(1 + s1)r1
t  p

1  c
 (E )

 1  c
 (max   ) :
Secondly, we show that I (; )  I (r; )8, r 2

0; ED f jr g   c
i
. Note
rst that I (r; ) is decreasing in r, if
 t+ p+ t(1 + s1)r1 + ct(1 + s1)r1


  (ED f jr g   r)  (   r) (@ED f jr g =@r   1)
(ED f jr g   r)2
 0:
We can obviously always nd an appropriate belief ED f jr g such that the condition
t(1 + s1)r1  t  p is su¢ cient.
With a strictly positive equilibrium report, though, there is a third type of devi-
ation to consider, the one to a lower report. This kind of deviation provides a direct
38
benet of higher income, but also a danger of more intensive auditing. By the same
logic as above, the most protable deviation is to the zero report. Then we should
have
(t  p)
t(1 + s1)r1
+

1  



1  c
 (E )

 1  c
ED f j0g :
Clearly, for  = min, it is impossible to nd a beliefD that satises the inequality
above. Indeed, the left-hand side then turns into t p
t(1+s1)r1
, which is greater or equal to
1. Intuitively, the lowest type should prefer honest reporting to zero reporting, that
is
(1  t)     p   t(1 + s1)r1

1  c
ED f j0g

;
which clearly does not happen. By continuity, for  close to min, a pooling equilib-
rium cannot exist. On the other hand, for  close enough to zero, this should not
be a problem. Thus, there exists 1 such that
(t  p)1
t(1 + s1)minr1
+

1  
1
min

1  c
 (E 1)

= 1  c
max
:
At the extreme of t(1 + s1)r1 = t  p
1 = min
max   E
max   min ;
and no belief can rationalize an equilibrium with reports pooling above 1.
Compliance in pooling and separating equilibria
Finally, we consider the possibility to have more compliance in a pooling equilibrium
than in the separating equilibrium. As we have shown above, the lowest evasion level
in a pooling equilibrium isZ max
min
dF ()  1 = E min max   E
max   min =
max (E min)
max   min < E
In the weak separating equilibrium with p = t, the evasion volume is c= < min from
the existence condition. A su¢ cient condition on distribution is then
max (E 2min) + 2min > 0:
For symmetric distributions, this condition simplies to
max > 2min;
39
which seems to be a very weak condition (if the minimal prot is 100 dollars, the
maximal should be at least 200 dollars). The condition holds a fortifori for the
distributions with higher mass on higher prots.
E - Properties of complete separating equilibrium
Dene equilibrium evasion volume e () :=    r ().
Proposition A1 In the complete separating equilibrium dened by the reporting
function (5), evasion volume is a decreasing and concave function of prot,
de()
d
< 0; d
2e()
d2
< 0.
Taking the reporting strategy (5), we di¤erentiate evasion volume with respect to
prot
de ()
d
= 1  d

r
d
=

B

  1

e
B
c
(r() r(max))d

r
d
:
We know that for p < t, B=   1 < 0. As dr
d
> 0 and the exponent is positive,
de()
d
< 0.
Di¤erentiating the evasion volume second time, we obtain
de2 ()
d2
=  d
2r
d2
=

B

  1

e
B
c
(r() r(max))
 
dr
d
2
+
d2r
d2
!
:
Rearranging, we get
de2 ()
d2
=

B

  1

e
B
c
(r() r(max))

dr
d
2
=

B

  1

e
B
c
(r() r(max)) + 1

:
As the nominator is negative, the second derivative can only be positive, if the denom-
inator is negative. Since the minimum of the rst term of denominator is achieved
at  = max, we must have B   1 + 1 < 0, which is impossible. Thus, the second
derivative is negative, de
2()
d2
< 0.
The decreasing evasion is a counter-intuitive result, as we would expect the rich
to evade more. After all, their reports are audited less. In our setting though, if
they evade more, they get audited disproportionately more, thus preferring to stay at
their separating equilibrium report. This does not contradict a common sense that
evasion makes the tax system more regressive. Indeed, without evasion the linear tax
rate implies a neutral tax system. In separating equilibrium though the tax system
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becomes regressive, as after tax expected income is increasing faster than before-tax
income. Formally, this leads us to the following corollary:
Corollary A1 In the complete separating equilibrium dened by the reporting func-
tion (5), the linear tax is regressive, d
2I
d2
= (t  p  t(1 + s1)r1) @2e()@2 > 0.
This result can be obtained by direct di¤erentiation of the expected after-tax
prot (2).
F - Proof of proposition 4
From the equilibrium structure in propositions 1-3 we can see that the specialists
prot maximization (12) can be split into three subproblems: pooling, strict separa-
tion and (possibly) weak separation. The maximization in the pooling equilibrium
is trivial: since the evasion volume is xed, the local prot maximizing price is p =
t (1  r1 (1 + s1)). For the weak separating equilibrium the prot function can be
written as (p  cs   str1r) e, the rst derivative is
e+ (p  cs   str1) e0:
Using the explicit expression for e from (7) in proposition 1 this can be rewritten as
  t+ cs, which is positive i¤ condition (13) is satised. Thus, in this case the local
prot maximizing price is p = t. Correspondingly, the local maximizing price is the
minimal price that supports weak separating or hybrid equilibrium, i¤ condition (13)
is not satised.
The least tractable case is the strong separating or hybrid equilibrium. However,
we are able to show that under condition (13) it is strictly dominated by an equilibrium
with p = t. The condition for that is
(p  cs   str1)
Z max
min
(   r (p; )) dF () < (t  cs   str1) c

(30)
for t (1  r1 (1 + s1)) < p < t (1  r1 (1 + s1) r) :
After rearranging and using the fact that
R max
min
dF () = 1 and p  cs   str1  0
(otherwise the separating equilibrium brings about less than sure minimum of cs
1+s+s1
to
the specialist) we get
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Z max
min
(   r (p; )) dF () < c (t  cs   str1)
 (p  cs   str1) : (31)
From (5) we know that
   r(p; ) < c
B
8;
(for a hybrid equilibrium this is only true for the separating part, and for the pooling
part there is a weaker condition E (j  0) < c=B, which is su¢ cient for us, asR max
min
(   r (p; )) dF () = E (j  0) +
R max
0
(   r(p; )) dF ()) so thatZ max
min
(   r(p; )) dF () <
Z max
min
c
B
dF () =
c
B
: (32)
Now, if also
c
B
<
c (t  cs   str1)
 (p  cs   str1) ; (33)
then the prot in any strict separating equilibrium is dominated by the prot at t.
Simply rearranging (33) we get
0 < + cs   t
This is the condition (13), so it is only left to show that under this condition the
full cheating equilibrium is never preferred:
c

(t  cs   str1) > (t  cs   )E: (34)
Since c= < E and str1 < , t  cs str1 > t  cs . We have just established that
t  cs    < 0. If t  cs   str1  0, then (34) is clearly satised. If t  cs   str1 < 0,
then notice that 0 < c= < E and hence (34) is satised again.
G - Payo¤s and comparative statics
The proposition 4 characterizes the equilibrium of the game with a specialist. In the
following we discuss the factors that (i) a¤ect cheating and auditing in the separating
equilibrium; (ii) inuence the behavior of agents in the pooling equilibrium; (iii) drive
the system into separation or pooling.
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Separation at p = t
The specialist prots under separation or hybrid equilibrium can be obtained by
substituting p = t into (12):
s =
c

(t  cs) : (35)
The prot is increasing in the tax rate, auditing costs and decreasing in enforcement
parameters and specialists costs. Notice that the specialist extracts all the rent from
the tax evasion, leaving the rms indi¤erent between cheating and being honest.
In this equilibrium the auditing never happens, and evasion e (t) = c= is minimal
and constant across income levels (apart from the pooled types in a hybrid equilib-
rium). The comparative statics is conventional here: evasion is increasing in auditing
costs and decreasing in enforcement parameters; nes on rms and the specialist have
an equivalent impact.
Pooling
Substituting p = t (1  r1 (1 + s1)) into (12), we get specialist prots in pooling
p = (t  cs   )E + cs
1 + s+ s1
: (36)
The prot is trivially decreasing in the specialists costs and increasing in auditing
costs. It is increasing in the tax rate if the enforcement is not su¢ ciently strong
(1 + s+ s1) r1 < 1 and decreasing otherwise. The nes on the rms unambiguously
decreases specialists protability22. In the pooling equilibrium a part of the rent
is left with the rms to make sure they do not prefer partial evasion of separating
equilibrium. Everybody evades everything in this case: r  0.
The deep auditing probability is given by r = 1 c= (E), and it approaches unity
as the auditing costs approach zero. The probability has conventional properties: it
is decreasing in auditing costs and decreasing in enforcement parameters, tax rate
and rmsprot.
22Notice that the ne on the specialist would increase her prots for c > E
1+s+s1
1+s1
, but this is
ruled out by the assumption that c < E.
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Separation versus pooling
We have seen that the low auditing costs and high nes are good for separation. The
higher specialist costs give more chances for separation as well. The impact of the
enforcement mix is ambiguous: stricter enforcement in terms of s1 decreases marginal
attractiveness of separation at p = t by (t  cs) c=2, but also decreases that of
pooling by E + cs= (1 + s+ s1)
2. Thus, the condition for a stricter enforcement to
work into the direction of separation is E (1 + s+ s1)
2 =c+s > (t  cs) = (tr1)2. This
is only not satised for small values of r1.
H - Proof of proposition 5
Dene a function P that takes negative values if and only if the equilibrium of the
game is pooling,
P := (p   cs   str1)
Z max
min
e (p; ) dF ()  (t  cs   )E   cs
1 + s+ s1
:
The e¤ectiveness of a ne in the sense of the present proposition is then just a deriv-
ative of the function P with respect to the corresponding ne. It is left to show that
dP
ds
< dP
ds1
. We have then
dP
ds
=

dp
ds
  tr1
Z max
min
e (p; ) dF ()
+ (p   cs   str1)
Z max
min
e (p; )
dp
dp
ds
dF () + tr1E   c (1 + s+ s1)  cs
(1 + s+ s1)
2 ;
dP
ds1
=
dp
ds1
Z max
min
e (p; ) dF ()
+ (p   cs   str1)
Z max
min
e (p; )
dp
dp
ds1
dF () + tr1E +
cs
(1 + s+ s1)
2 :
The di¤erence is
dP
ds1
  dP
ds
=
dp
ds1
  dp

ds
+ tr1
Z max
min
e (p; ) dF ()
+ (p   cs   str1)
Z max
min
ep (p
; )
dp
ds1
dF () 
Z max
min
ep (p
; )
dp
ds
dF ()

+
c
1 + s+ s1
:
Recall that from the denition of p we haveZ max
min
e (p; ) dF () + (p   cs   str1)
Z max
min
ep (p
; ) dF () = 0;
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so that the expression above becomes
dP
ds1
  dP
ds
= tr1
Z max
min
e (p; ) dF () +
c
1 + s+ s1
> 0:
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